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Investigates the hypothesis that spatial processes are involved in judgments on 
membership in a category.  It is argued that membership versus nonmembership of an object 
or a concept, in a category, is spatially simulated in mental space by a minimal continuum 
with two levels, left for membership and right for nonmembership.  In analogy to other 
embodied dimensions (e.g., time line or number line), the orientation of membership levels 
on the mental dimension is assumed to follow the acquired reading/writing schema, with 
procedural primacy implying dominance, hence leftward positioning of dominant elements.   
This rationale is tested in seven experiments. A recognition memory paradigm 
(modified 2AFC paradigm, Experiment 1) revealed that participants were faster indicating the 
location of an old word on the screen when displayed left within a pair of words, indicating a 
spatial representation of category membership (“member” = left,  “nonmember” = right).  For 
category discrimination (Experiment 2) we found faster and more accurate performance when 
a target word is presented left as compared to right.  This pattern is replicated in Experiments 
4a and 4b, with different response alternatives.  Discriminating categories in a stimulus-
response compatibility paradigm (Experiment 3), participants were faster making correct 
responses with their left hand than with their right hand in target category trials.  In contrast, 
no differences were found for distractor trials.  Experiments 5a and 5b address the spatial bias 
in spontaneous sorting situations.  Overall, this pattern of results across the three experiments 
provides evidence in support of a spatial simulation of category assignment.   
 249 words 
Key Words: Recognition memory, category discrimination, stimulus-response 
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In everyday life, our flow of behaviour and action frequently demands the making of 
binary judgments of the form:  “Does this stimulus (object, entity, person, etc.) belong to that 
category (A, B, C, etc.)?”  For example, we are asked “Is this bird a puffin?”, or, “Is this one 
of the cups you bought yesterday?”, and so on.  In these cases, membership of a salient target 
in a target category is positive (“yes”), and nonmembership is negative (“no”).  The result of 
such a binary decision is then made available to further reasoning.  In this paper, we are 
interested in the question whether decisions of the described kind are spatially supported in 
cognition, and if so, how.   
There are a number of reasons for considering the possibility that spatial processes are 
involved in binary decisions, such as judgments on category membership.  First, from the 
perspective of mental models (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Knauff, 
2013), the case of membership in a category could be simulated in an abstract way by placing 
something, mentally, onto a location that stands for “member” and placing nothing onto the 
remaining location that stands for “nonmember”.  This implies two distinct locations for the 
two possibilities in mental space (Tversky, 1993; Kosslyn, 1994).  Second, the 
neurophysiology of decision making hints at mechanisms involving one particular structure 
within the parietal brain, the Inferior Parietal Lobule (IPL).  This structure has been identified 
as important for spatial processing and behaviour in space, with recordings of single neurons 
in this area, as obtained from monkey models, that responded in ways corresponding to 
spatial stimulation (Andersen, Essick, & Siegel, 1985).  At the same time, as more recent 
research has found, the IPL structure is involved in decision making under uncertainty, as 
shown in different input modalities, auditory and visual, as well (Vickery & Jiang, 2009).  
Also, activation changes have been observed in the parietal cortex, as a function of 
participants’ responding in the two-alternative-forced-choice paradigm, as used in recognition 
memory research (implying “old” vs. “new” decisions).  These activation changes were 
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related not only to the formation of a decision, but also to the confidence associated with 
making it (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009).   
Third, in our own research (von Hecker, Klauer, Wolf, & Fazilat-Pour, 2016) we found 
evidence for spatial support during reasoning about rank orders: When an element A 
dominated another element B within a previously learned series of transitive ranks, for 
example, age (i.e., A being older than B), Western participants, using the left and right arrow 
keys, were quicker to identify the dominating (=older) element when A was presented to the 
left of B on a computer screen, rather than in the opposite spatial positioning.  This effect 
reversed when the experiment was replicated in Iran, with participants who were only 
exposed to right-o-left scripture, implying that the spatial effect relied on the acquired 
reading/writing habit.  Related to the perspective of the present paper, the ordinal information 
of the individual test item, as used in our series of experiments, may be expressed in a binary 
way.  For example, choosing which test item is the “older” one may be seen as a binary 
categorization of one item as “older” and the other one as “not older”.  In the context of such 
an individual test item, the ordinal information contained in the overall rank order is 
condensed into binary information, preserving the order characteristic by seeing “older” as 
dominating “not older”.  From this perspective, facilitation occurs if the location of the 
element identified as “older” is in the same orientation on the screen as the category “older” 
is located in mental space.  In contrast to this situation, however, in the present paper we are 
interested in examining similar spatial effects in cases where there is, at the outset, no ordinal 
information available to frame that binary decision, but just qualitative information, that is, 
about “membership” in a category versus “nonmembership”.  In other words, we are 
investigating whether spatial representations (with order characteristics) are involved in the 




Spatial Representation of abstract Concepts: The dimensional Case 
Within a number of dimensional domains, the signature evidence for the involvement 
of spatial processing in a cognitive task comes from spatial asymmetry effects.  For example, 
Suitner and Maass (2016) defined the so-called “Spatial Agency Bias” as the tendency to 
imagine the trajectory of movement of an action or event that is perceived as “agentic” (i.e., 
strong, intense, initiative, vital, etc.) as proceeding rightwards from a left origin (see also 
Chatterjee, 2001).  They argue that the dimension of “agency” might be represented in an 
embodied way, implying a motion schema proceeding from left to right, as adapted from the 
learned reading/writing schema.  The authors also report evidence that this bias reverses 
when studied amongst populations that live in a right-left reading/writing environment (e.g., 
Maass, Suitner, Favaretto, & Cignacchi, 2009; Maass & Russo, 2003; Maass, Suitner, & 
Nadhmi, 2014; Tversky, Kugelmass, & Winter, 1991).  A second domain relevant to left-
right asymmetries as a signature of spatial representations is the so-called SNARC effect 
(“spatial numerical association of response codes” (Fias, 1996; Gevers, Caessens, & Fias, 
2005).  In cultures with left-to-right reading and writing, a mental number line represents 
numerical magnitude, increasing from left to right, with this direction again reversing in 
populations with an opposite right-left-system (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Zebian, 
2005).  A third dimensional domain is the mental representation of time as a line with left 
origin (in left-to-right reading cultures) as the time line begins in the perceived present, and 
moves to the right as time passes on (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 
2010).  Distinguishing between words as relating to the past or future is quicker in Western 
participants if past-related words are shown left and future-related words right on a screen 
(Ouellet, Santiago, Funes, & Lupiáñez, 2010; Santiago, Lupiáñez, Pérez, & Funes, 2007).  
Left-hand responses are faster than right-hand responses for months at the beginning of the 
year as compared to months at the end of the year (Gevers, Reynvoet, & Fias, 2003).  
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Tversky et al. (1991) had children arrange pictures into temporally ordered stories and found 
a tendency to order these from left to right in English-speaking children, whereas this 
tendency reversed in Arab and Hebrew children who were used to right-to-left-written 
languages.  However, preliterate kindergarteners did not show any such spatial biases (Dobel, 
Diesendruck, & Bölte, 2007) which again hints at the tight connection between acquired 
reading/writing habits and the orientation of the mental time line.    
Spatial Representation of abstract Concepts: The Case of Categories 
The concepts of agency, numerical magnitude, and time all are examples for spatial 
processes supporting abstract reasoning by providing an oriented dimension onto which the 
abstract concept is projected.  Questions now arising are, first, in what way this projection is 
modelled after the acquired reading/writing habit; and second, what reasons there are to think 
that similar processes might exist in the case of categorical membership, that is, the 
assignment of a target to a category.   
One way how the left-right-oriented mental dimension can be modelled after the 
culturally learned reading/writing schema is that the reading/writing schema is abstracted to, 
or yields the model for, a general schema of sequential action (Chatterjee, Southwood, & 
Basilico, 1999; Suitner & Maass, 2016; Patro, Nuerk, & Cress, 2015).  Such a schema, as a 
dimension, will serve two purposes.  First, it allows one to represent order of magnitude, 
because different locations on the dimension will reflect different levels of magnitude in 
terms of an embodied simulation (Hegarty, 2004; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-
Gruber, & Ric, 2005).  Second, the notion of sequential action, abstracted from the 
reading/writing process, itself implies higher primacy of elements the closer to the origin of 
the dimension they are situated.  We use the term “p imacy” here in the sense of a generalised 
notion of “what comes first / has most immediacy (therefore: importance)”, referring to a 
sequence in processing.  Thus, if one assumes that the origin of the dimension has highest 
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primacy, the maximum of the dimension is likely to be located at the origin, as there is reason 
to assume that magnitude/dominance is easily conflated and metaphorically blended with the 
notion of primacy (Casasanto, 2009):  “The first in a series (or a pair) is the leftmost (…).  
Linguistic expressions like ‘the prime example’ conflate primacy with goodness (i.e., this 
phrase can mean the first example, the best example, or both).  Speakers of languages like 
English may be predisposed to consider the leftmost item to be the first and therefore the 
best.” (Casasanto, 2009, p. 362)1.  In this example, it is assumed that goodness is a magnitude 
or an asset, and that more goodness dominates less goodness.  From this perspective, the 
answer to our first question is that in general, the projection of an abstract concept onto a 
dimension in mental space can be modelled after the acquired reading/writing habit because 
the latter provides an overlearned, familiar schema of primacy that allows for an ordered 
differentiation along the dimension, of degrees in magnitude (Lourenco & Longo, 2010; 
Lourenco, Ayzenberg, & Lyu, 2016; Walsh, 2003).  But this projection also allows for the 
anchoring of the dimensional maximum at the left side; that is, on the basis of a 
“metaphorical blend” between primacy and dimensional dominance (Casasanto, 2009; see 
also Pecher, Van Dantzig, Boot, Zanolie, & Huber, 2010).   In support of this, in one of our 
earlier experiments (von Hecker et al., 2016, Experiment 4b) we found that participants, after 
having learnt a series of stimuli of different heights, were faster to indicate which was the 
“taller” one within a horizontally presented pair, via left and right arrow keys, in trials that 
showed the taller one on the left, as compared to the taller one on the right.  This bias was not 
observed, however, when learning and testing took place the same way, but using “shorter” to 
describe differences in height.  In describing levels of height, “taller” as the unmarked2 
expression (Hamilton & Deese, 1971) represented a positive magnitude and was therefore 
more likely to be blended with primacy, thus located at the left side where the dimension was 
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anchored, as compared to “shorter” which, as the marked expression, represented a lack of 
magnitude.   
Our second question relates to the assignment of a target to a category.  On what 
grounds can we generalise the above reasoning to this case?  First, we argue that in the 
context of category assignment, membership can be described as a (minimal) order 
dimension with two levels, “member” and “nonmember”, whereby “member” is mentally 
represented by simulating a positive entity/magnitude, and “nonmember” by a lack of 
magnitude.  This brings an ordinal characteristic to the dimension, as “member” dominates 
“nonmember”.  Therefore, secondly, we argue that metaphorical blending will produce a 
tendency to mentally place the category “member” to the left, for greater primacy, and the 
category of “nonmember” to the right.  As a general hypothesis pertaining to the experiments 
reported below, we expect an interaction between the assumed mental representation of 
category membership and the experimental display of stimuli, in order to gain evidence for 
the spatial support of category assignment.  In other words, if a participant makes a judgment 
about a target object/word/entity as being a member of a particular category, this is 
tantamount to the participant placing the target onto that particular location in mental space 
where “positive membership” is simulated.  Therefore, if the display orientation of the target 
(as left vs. right on a screen) is congruent with the orientation of the hypothesized categories 
of “member” vs. “nonmember”, then a response should be made more quickly than when the 
display orientation is incongruent with that mental representation of category membership. 
 
Experiment 1: Recognition Memory 
Recognition memory is chosen as a first example to demonstrate the above ideas, 
mainly for methodological reason as will become clear immediately.  Still, it is necessary to 
shortly recapitulate some of the theoretical discussion within this literature, in order to clarify 
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the relevant methodological point.  Generally, the pertaining models (for a review, see 
Malmberg, 2008) either assume that a latent familiarity variable determines a recognition-
memory judgment, as signal detection theory (SDT) does (see Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 
1961).  Alternatively, some models assume discrete processes, such as the two-high-threshold 
model (e.g., Bröder & Schütz, 2009), or dual-process SDT models (e.g., Yonelinas & Parks, 
2007).  We do not enter this discussion here (but see Kellen & Klauer, 2014, for an approach 
aimed at comparing the two principal alternatives), as the present paper deals with the 
representational outcomes of such processes, and not the processes themselves.  Instead we 
will focus on a methodological issue within one particular paradigm that is often used to 
inform these debates, which is the two-alternatives-forced-choice paradigm (2AFC).   
In this paradigm, a participant learns a list of items and is later asked to select one of two 
items in a presented pair as “old”, that is, as part of the previously learned set.  Thus, as two 
words are presented side by side horizontally on a screen, this paradigm suits the present 
enquiry well because it implements a possibility of creating displays that are congruent, or 
incongruent, with the mental representation of category membership.  Therefore, if a 
participant is asked to quickly indicate the side on which the old item is located, and if 
generating a response is associated with mentally placing the old word to the left side, then 
that mental representation will be either aligned with, or stand in conflict, with the perceived 
display.  For the latter case, longer response latencies are expected.  In terms of accuracies, 
expectations are less determinate.  Empirically, left-anchoring effects, that is, lower accuracy 
levels in the conflict case, have been observed alongside latency effects in some studies, 
whereas in others, left-anchoring effects remained limited to latencies (see von Hecker et al., 
2016; Suitner & Maass, 2016).  
One constraint of the 2AFC paradigm is that one has to declare one and only one of the 
items old, regardless of whether any or both of them might meet an internal criterion for 
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recognition as “old” (Egan, 1975; Hicks & Marsh, 1998; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991; 
Smith & Duncan, 2004).  This means that the emphasis is placed on making a relative
judgment; that is, to compare both items against each other in the sense of reliance on signal-
strength difference, rather than bsolute signal strength level (Glanzer & Adams, 1990; 
Glanzer & Bowles, 1976; Green & Swets, 1966; Smith & Duncan, 2004).  The paradigm has 
therefore been argued to be criterion-free (Egan, 1975; Hicks & Marsh, 1998; Macmillan & 
Creelman, 1991).   However, recent findings provide evidence to the contrary.  It appears that 
participants sometimes generate their judgments on the basis of individual-item recognition, 
therefore relying on an absolute criterion of recognition.  First, Jou, Flores, Cortes, and Leka 
(2016) found left-biased choices in horizontally presented pairs, consisting of either one new 
and one old item (“normal”), or both-new, or both-old items (“null”).  Such left-bias was 
associated with higher hit and false alarm rates, as well as shorter left- than right-choice 
response times, for “normal” pairs.  This pattern is consistent with assuming that participants 
made their decision on the basis of a left-individual-item recognition (presumably according 
to their reading/writing habit), without taking both items of the pair into account.  For “null” 
pairs, latencies were longer in case of both-new than both-old pairs, which again supports the 
idea of judgments based on absolute, rather than relative, levels of familiarity.  Second, in a 
study using eye-tracking procedures, Starns, Chen, and Staub (2017) provided evidence for 
absolute judgments, using pairs of old items and lures for testing in a horizontal presentation.  
They found that participants, especially in correct trials selecting the old item, looked at the 
old one first and exclusively, which happened most often when the old item was positioned 
on the left side.  In trials when they looked at both items in the pair, participants were more 
often correct when they fixated the old one first than when they fixated the lure first, 




Thus, the left-bias as found in the 2AFC paradigm s informative in relation to the 
theoretical assumptions about the process of generating a judgment as being either relative or 
absolute.  That is, the left bias arises as a consequence of decision strategies that process only 
the left item displayed in an absolute judgment.  But exactly the susceptibility to such biases 
makes the paradigm problematic, if unmodified, as a tool for investigating the spatial 
representation of the judgment.  The left-bias originating from absolute versus relative 
response generation would be superimposed on, or conflated with, any potential left-bias 
stemming from processing a spatial representation of category membership.  In this 
experiment, we therefore implement a modified methodology that eliminates spatial bias that 
would be unrelated to a possible effect genuinely arising from the display orientation being 




Data in this and all following main experiments (except Experiment 5) were collected 
in Germany.  The present research used only procedures that are exempt from formal ethical 
approval under the ethical guidelines of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie [German 
Psychological Society].  All participants gave written consent and were formally debriefed. 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate students from the University of Freiburg (27 female, 13 male, 
mean age = 26.9 years) took part in the experiment, all with German-spoken backgrounds. 
They received course credit or €5.00 for their participation.   
Materials  
The word pool used for the experiment contained 644 neutral German nouns taken from 
Lahl, Göritz, Pietrowsky, and Rosenberg (2009) ranging from 4 to 8 letters in length. 
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According to the ratings obtained by Lahl et al. (2009), the words were all of medium valence 
(ranging from 3.5 to 6.5 on an 11-point scale) and low in arousal (ranging from 0.5 to 4.5 on 
an 11-point scale). Furthermore, all words were of approximately equal word frequency in 
common German, as indicated by log frequency ratings obtained for each word via WordGen 
(ranging from 0.3 to 2.9; Duyck, Desmet, Verberke, & Brysbart, 2004). 
Using this word pool, 240 words were randomly selected for each participant.  These 
were divided into 12 groups (six blocks times two conditions: ld vs. new, of 20 words each).  
All stimuli were displayed on a computer screen in white Arial font (12 mm height) against a 
black background.  For pairs, the words were presented 25 mm to the left or to the right of the 
horizontal screen centre, creating a gap of 50 mm between them.  All stimuli were presented 
at the vertical screen center.   
Procedure 
After reading instructions, participants were seated approximately 60 cm in front of the 
computer screen.  They were then presented with the learning phase of the first experimental 
block.  Each block had a learning phase and a testing phase.  In a learning phase, a participant 
viewed all 20 words that were to be classified “old” in the test phase one by one without 
having to respond, with each word presented for 3s, divided by a 300 ms interstimulus 
interval.  In the immediately following test phase, 40 word pairs were presented in a random 
sequence.  Each pair was initiated by a fixation cross in the center of the screen (800 ms), 
followed by the word pair that could be of either of four types, “old-old” (5 pairs), “new-
new” (5 pairs), “old-new” (5 pairs), or “new-old” (5 pairs), with the first word always 
appearing on the left side and the second word appearing simultaneously on the right side.  
This presentation opened an unlimited response window.  After the participant’s response, a 
600 ms intertrial interval followed until the next fixation cross appeared.  The task was in 
each trial to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible, which of the four pair types one 
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had just seen.  As a response aid, a graphical arrangement of the four response alternatives 
was presented in the lower right corner of the screen, see Figure 1.  In this display, the labels 
“old-old”, “old-new”, “new-old”, “new-new” were arranged in an order similar to the 
arrangement of the four directional arrow keys which were marked as the response keys for 
participants to use.  The arrangement always showed the label “old-new” corresponding to 
the position of the left arrow key, the label “new-old” corresponding to the position of the 
right arrow key.  The labels “old-old” and “new-new” were placed in the arrangement as 
corresponding to the positions of the up and down arrow keys, with the label positions and 
corresponding key assignments alternated between participants as a counterbalancing factor. 
There were six blocks with the above structure.  Interspersed between every two blocks 
was a short distraction block consisting of four easy arithmetic problems which participants 
responded to using marked keys.  This was done to clear the words from the previous block 
from memory.  Learning and test phases as described occurred six times, corresponding to the 
six experimental blocks.  The experiment lasted about 25 min, including debriefing.  
 
Results 
The accuracy and latency data of the experiments in this paper were each analysed in 
two steps. In the first step, we estimated mixed linear models (for the accuracy data: 
generalized mixed linear models with logistic link function) with participants as random 
factor, in order to determine which random structure would best fit the data.  Subsequently, a 
final model was defined using the above information, and fixed effects were statistically 
evaluated on the basis of that final model (see Jaeger, 2008; Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012).  
The strategy for selecting a model with appropriate random-effects structure is described in 
Appendix A, along with information about the particular random-effect structure adopted for 




The overall error level (i.e., pressing the incorrect key) was 27%, across all participants 
and all test pairs in all blocks.  For the present analysis, only trials involving “old-new” and 
“new-old” trials were considered.  The final model used for analysis contained fixed effects 
for the counterbalancing factor (between participants, counterbalancing response key 
positions: “old-old” corresponding to “arrow up” vs. corresponding to “arrow down”), block 
(1,…, 6), side of old word (left vs. right), as well as the interactions of these factors.  There 
was a significant fixed factor effect for block, χ2(5) = 11.33; p < .05, indicating that 
responses were less correct in the last block (Mblock 6  = .66,) compared to previous blocks 
(Mblocks 1-5  = .73,), as post-hoc contrast analysis revealed (p = .051).  There was also a 
significant interaction between the counterbalancing factor and side of old word, χ2(1) = 8.95; 
p < .003.  As Holm-corrected simple effects revealed, responses were more accurate in trials 
involving old words on the left side than old words on the right side, when “old-old” 
responses had to be made with the down-arrow key, (MOldOld down/Old Left = .76, vs. MOldOld 
down/Old Right = .69).  When “old-old” responses had to be made with the up-arrow key, this 
difference was not significant (MOldOld up/Old Left = .71, vs. MOldOld up/Old Right = .72).  A 
significant interaction between block and side of old word showed that the side of old word 
effect, which itself was at tendency level overall (χ2(1) = 2.90; p = .09; MOld Left = .74, vs. MOld 
Right = .70), varied in direction and size across the six blocks, see Table 1, χ2(5) = 16.66; 
p < .005.  No other significant effects emerged.  
Response latencies  
For correct responses, latency data were trimmed according to the Tukey criterion 
based on excluding outliers with values larger (smaller) than the upper (lower) quartile by 1.5 
times the interquartile range in the individual’s distribution of latencies (see Clark-Carter, 
2004, Chapter 9).  In the linear mixed model, a significant main effect was found for the 
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counterbalancing factor, F(1,38.00) = 9.82; p < .003, showing that responses were faster 
when the “old-old” response option was associated with the up-arrow key than with the 
down-arrow key (MOldOld Up = 1897 ms, vs. MOldOld down = 2644 ms).  A significant main effect 
for block indicated that across the duration of the experiment, participants tended to get faster 
in responding overall, F(5,31.66) = 4.42; p < .004, (MBlock 1 = 2673 ms, MBlock 2 = 2364 ms, 
MBlock 3 = 2304 ms, MBlock 4 = 2119 ms, MBlock 5 = 2110 ms, MBlock 6 = 2104 ms), indicating a 
practice effect.  Finally, and crucial to the hypothesis, there was a significant main effect of 
side of old word, F(1,37.37) = 6.75; p < .013.  This effect indicated that, as predicted, correct 
responses to old words were faster when the old word in a pair was presented on the left, 
rather than the right, side of the screen (MOld Left = 2201 ms, vs. MOld Right = 2345 ms, Cohen’s 
d = .37).    
Examining latencies for trials with incorrect responses, latencies were found to be at 
almost the same level for both sides of old word (MOld Left = 2355 ms, vs. MOld Right = 2336 
ms), t(246.20) = 1.21; p = .22, which makes it unlikely that quicker key pressing on the left 
side as such, as a general tendency, could explain the data.  
Control via vertical response configuration 
We also looked into the possibility that the vertical dimension, as likewise involved in 
reading direction (its being not only left-to right but also top-to-bottom), could provide an 
equal scaffold for responding.  It could be that the reading/writing habit (in horizontal or 
vertical terms) would generate faster responses irrespective of matching processes with a 
spatially represented category.  Rather, in this case, a response could simply be made quicker 
if it was performed on top as compared to the bottom.  Latencies associated with correct 
responses to “old-old” and “new-new” responses (for which the response keys were vertically 
arranged) were therefore analysed in a similar linear mixed model as above, with fixed 
effects for the counterbalancing factor (between participants, counterbalancing response key 
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positions: “old-old” corresponding to “arrow up” vs. corresponding to “arrow down”), block 
(1,…, 6), type of pair (“old-old” vs. “new-new”), as well as the interactions of these factors.  
There was a significant effect for group, F(1,38.64) = 9.80; p = .003, showing shorter 
response latencies for both vertical options in the group who had to press “up” for “old-old” 
(MOldOld Up = 1790 ms) than in the group who had to use the same key for “new-new” (MOldOld 
down = 2170 ms).  “New-new” stimuli (MNewNew = 1924 ms) were generally responded to faster 
than “old-old” stimuli, (MOldOld  = 2073 ms), F(1,40.90) = 5.10; p = .03, but crucially, the 
interaction between the counterbalancing factor and type of pair was insignificant, 
F(1,40.90) = 1.23; p = .27.  If the upper position of the response key was to generally 
engender faster responses than the bottom position, this interaction should have been 
significant.  On the other hand, metaphorical blending could potentially take place in the 
vertical dimension, such that, in terms of representation, “old-old” stimuli were to be 
positioned on top of  “new-new” stimuli.  In this case again, we would have expected the 
above interaction to be significant, that is, to show that correct responses to “old-old” would 
be faster than responses to “new-new”, but only in the group in which the “old-old”-on-top 
response mapping had been administered4.    
Discussion 
In the first experiment, participants were faster to indicate the location of an old word 
on the screen when the old word was displayed as the left member of a pair of words.  We 
interpret this finding as evidence for the representation of category assignment in mental 
space.  Specifically, we argue that category membership is spatially represented as a binary 
dimension with “member” mentally positioned left, and “nonmember” positioned right.  
Faster responding simply based on a matching of reading/writing-primacy to response keys is 
unlikely insofar the vertical dimension, as likewise providing a primacy differential for 
responding, did not exhibit a systematic bias in the vertical control trials.   
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The original 2AFC-paradigm was modified.  Instead of two response alternatives (“old-
new”, “new-old”), we provided four alternatives, introducing the cases of “old-old” and 
“new-new”.  In terms of internal validity, these changes had two consequences.  First, by 
virtue of having to decide between four possibilities, a participant had to pay attention to both 
words in a pair, rather than being able to rely on individual-item recognition (Jou et al., 2016; 
Starns et al., 2017).  This counteracted any potential left-bias due to only focusing on the first 
word when starting to read from the left.  Such factors could therefore not confound the target 
effect as reported here.  Second, attention being given to both words means that a spatial 
labelling of each word in the pair as either “left” or “right” was possible.  This seems crucial 
in a situation where one attempts to create a stimulus display that either matches or 
mismatches the hypothesized spatial mental representation of membership dimension as left 
(member) versus right (nonmember).  It is argued here that as part of the process of 
generating a response, a participant mentally simulates, on the left side in mental space, the 
word which they think belongs to the target category, and on the right side the word which 
they think does not belong to the target category.  If, in a trial, this mental orientation meets a 
perceptual display that is spatially in line with it, responding is quick.  If the display runs 
counter that spatial representation, interference occurs and the response is slowed down.  
 
Experiment 2: Category Discrimination 
The general assumption to be tested here is that due to metaphorical blending 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Casasanto, 2009; Pecher et al., 2010), membership in a target 
category is simulated as a positive magnitude (implying dominance), has therefore higher 
primacy than nonmembership and is, for this reason, simulated on the left side.  In 
Experiment 1 however, it could be argued that not membership per se, or exclusively, might 
have driven the effect, but that a stronger memory trace of old words as compared to new 
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words in terms of recollection, or a greater familiarity of old words over new words, might 
have at least co-determined dominance and, consequently, the blending with primacy.  Thus, 
the role of membership er se to the target category still needs further exploration as a 
determinant of primacy.  Experiment 2 therefore aims at using materials that do not imply 
differences in memory traces, or familiarity differences, between the sets of stimuli that 
belong, or do not belong, to the target category.  Using taxonomic materials also addresses a 
possible confound in Experiment 1, as the relation between old and new may be simulated 
along the time line from left to right (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Fuhrman & Boroditsky, 
2010), thereby implying primacy for old, which would predict a left-bias in the experiment on 
the basis of this particular time-related connotation, without necessarily giving support to our 
basic hypothesis which claims a spatial representation of category membership as left by a 
blend of dominance and primacy based on reading/writing.   
We chose basic categories (Leinster, 2016; Rosch, 1978) as being at a level of 
generality most preferred by humans in their reasoning and memorisation (Rosch, 1978).  
Since the exemplars of such categories can be uniformly assumed as well accessible within 
typical populations (Rosch, 1978), we did not anticipate systematic differences in memory 
trace or familiarity between target and nontarget categories as used in the study, provided 
these were chosen randomly from an original pool of basic categories.  Selecting words with 
high typicality for each category helped minimising differences between the exemplars on 




Forty-three undergraduate students from the University of Freiburg (32 female, 11 
male, mean age = 23.4 years) took part in the experiment, all with German-spoken 
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backgrounds. They received course credits or €5.00 for their participation.  One participant 
was excluded for extremely slow average response time5, so the final N = 42.  
Materials  
The word pool used for this experiment provided German norms for semantic 
typicality, age of acquisition, and concept familiarity for 824 exemplars of 11 semantic 
categories (Schröder, Gemballa, Ruppin, & Wartenburger, 2012).  Using this word pool, the 
20 most typical words (with typicality highly correlated with familiarity) were selected from 
ten categories, animal, bird, clothes, fruit, furniture, musical instrument, profession, sport, 
tool, and vegetable.  Five experimental blocks were used, and for each block, two categories 
were randomly selected from the ten, one of them to be used as target category, the other as 
distractor category in that particular block.  For example, in a given block, “clothes” might 
serve as target category and “bird” as distractor category.   This way, potential differences in 
frequency or familiarity between the categories that could still exist were counterbalanced 
across blocks and participants.  In each presented word pair, either both, one, or none of the 
two words belonged to the target category.  All presentation specifications were the same as 
in Experiment 1.  
Procedure 
After reading instructions, participants were seated approximately 60 cm in front of the 
computer screen.  Different from Experiment 1, there was no learning phase, and each block 
started directly with a test phase.  In each test phase, 20 word pairs were presented in a 
random sequence, with the target category name (e.g., “furniture”) being constantly displayed 
in the upper left corner of the screen, as reminder.  Participants were asked to indicate as 
quickly and accurately as possible, which of the four category pair types “target – target ” (5 
pairs), “distractor – distractor” (5 pairs), “target – distractor” (5 pairs), or “distractor – target” 
(5 pairs) one had just been presented with.  The response labels used were “yes-yes”, “no-
18 
 
no”, “yes-no”, and “no-yes”, with yes meaning a target category instance, and no a non-target 
category instance.   
Presentation modalities and response options were the same as in Experiment 1.  
Between every two of the five blocks, a block of four easy arithmetic problems was presented 
as in Experiment 1.  The experiment lasted between 20 and 25 min, including debriefing.  
Results 
Accuracy 
The overall error level (i.e., pressing the incorrect key) was 5%, across all participants 
and all test pairs in all blocks, showing a lower level of difficulty as compared to Experiment 
1.  For the present analysis, only trials involving “target – distractor” and “distractor – target” 
trials were considered.  The final model used for analysis contained fixed effects for the 
counterbalancing factor (between participants, counterbalancing response key positions: 
“target – target” corresponding to “arrow up” vs. corresponding to “arrow down”), block 
(1,…, 5), side of target category word (left vs. right), as well as the interactions of these 
factors.  There was a significant fixed factor effect for side of target category word, 
χ2(1) = 12.38; p = .0004, indicating that responses were more accurate when the target 
category word was shown on the left side (Mtarget left  = .98) compared to the right side in a 
pair (Mtarget right  = .95).  No other significant effects emerged.  
Response latencies  
For correct responses, latency data were trimmed in the same way as in Experiment 1. 
The final linear mixed model used for the analyses had the same fixed effect structure as the 
one just reported for accuracy.  In this model, two significant main effects occurred.  First, 
the effect of block, F(4, 45.41) = 9.22; p < .0001, showed that responses became faster from 
Block 1 through Block 5, again reflecting a practice effect (MBlock 1 = 1503 ms, MBlock 2 = 1316 
ms, MBlock 3 = 1287 ms, MBlock 4 = 1276 ms, MBlock 5 = 1218 ms).  Second, the effect of side of 
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category word, F(1, 44.93) = 4.19; p < .05,  revealed that test pairs in which the target 
category word was presented left were associated with faster correct responses than pairs in 
which that word was presented on the right (Mtarget left = 1299 ms, vs. Mtarget right = 1341 ms, 
Cohen’s d = .25).  No further effects were significant.  We did not analyse the latencies of 
trials with incorrect responses because of the overall infrequency of errors. 
Control via vertical response configuration 
Again, we looked into the possibility that the vertical dimension could provide an equal 
scaffold for responding.  Latencies associated with correct responses to “yes-yes” and “no-
no” responses (for which the response keys were vertically arranged) were therefore analysed 
in a similar linear mixed model as above.  There were no significant effects except for the 
block factor, F(4,48.36) = 9.71; p < .001, indicating a practice effect in terms of responses 
becoming faster from the first block (Mblock 1  = 1490 ms) to the last block (Mblock 5  = 1332 
ms).  In particular, the interaction between the counterbalancing factor and type of pair was 
again insignificant, F(1,1641.99) = .81; p = .37.  This interaction would be expected under 
the assumption that either the upper position of the response key was to generate quicker 
responding in general, or that a metaphorical blending with respect to target and distractor 
categories, and with respect to the “yes-yes” and “no-no” stimuli, did happen in the vertical 
dimension.   
Discussion 
The present experiment did not use materials that would differ in memory strength, or 
familiarity, between stimuli in the target category and stimuli in the distractor category.  
Using basic categories also meant that these categories were well accessible throughout, such 
that the task became considerably easier (5% error against 27% error in Experiment 1).  
Under these conditions, the pattern obtained in Experiment 1 replicated.  We found that 
participants were faster and also more accurate when the word from the target category was 
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presented as the left rather than right member of a test pair of words.  The explanation for this 
pattern can now be related even more stringently to “membership” as the critical stimulus 
characteristic to be simulated, because target and distractor categories in each block did not 
differ in memory strength or familiarity.  Membership in the target category therefore appears 
to be simulated as a positive asset, as compared to nonmembership, which then affords to be 
blended with primacy.   
 
Experiment 3: Stimulus-Response Compatibility 
In the modified forced-choice method used so far, exemplars of both target and 
distractor categories form the stimulus ensemble within a given trial, and the response 
represents the outcome of processing both simultaneously.  It is, however, desirable to 
examine target and distractor words in isolation, as explained below.  In the present 
experiment, we use a stimulus-response-compatibility methodology in which participants are 
asked to respond either with their left or right hand, as used in studies on the spatial-
numerical-associations-of-response-codes (SNARC)- effect (e.g., Chatterjee, 2001; Dehaene 
et al., 1993; Gevers et al., 2005; Shaki, Fischer, & Petrusic, 2009).  In this paradigm the 
relevant effects, in line with our basic question, rest on congruence versus incongruence 
between the mental representation of a stimulus (in mental space) and the left-right response 
key locations, that is, the motor response that is asked for, and that is executed by the efferent 
system (in real space).  Different from the previous methodology which used pairs of stimuli, 
the present procedure allows us to work with individual words as stimuli, and therefore 
investigate asymmetries that might exist between target and distractor categories with respect 
to the spatial effects under study.  According to the present research hypothesis, when 
instructed to decide whether or not a presented word belongs to the target category (yes or 
no), a correct yes decision is associated with mentally placing the word to the left side 
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(“member”), or to the right side for a correct no decision (“nonmember”).  If the response has 
to be made with the hand that, laterally, corresponds to the location in mental space where the 
stimulus was placed, a faster response should occur as compared to the opposite case.  In 
other words, a left-bias is predicted for correct yes-responses to target category words, and a 
right-bias for correct no-responses to distractor category words.  A priori, this prediction is 
symmetric; that is, it holds in the same way for individual stimuli from both target and 
distractor categories.   
On the other hand, a general argument has been made about different processes being 
involved in correct responses to targets (hits) versus correct responses to distractors (correct 
rejections), during episodic retrieval (Yonelinas, 1994).  Evidence shows a difference in 
response latency between correct responses to targets versus distractors in paradigms 
comparable to ours.  For both episodic memory (old/new discrimination) as well as for 
category discrimination tasks (semantic classification), Bucur et al. (2008) found correct 
responses to target stimuli to be approximately 80 ms shorter than those to distractors.  
Similar differences between targets and distractors are reported by Kahn, Davachi, and 
Wagner (2004), as well as Kahana (2014).  Small differences, but still showing a latency 
advantage of hits over correct rejections, had been found by Nobel and Shiffrin (2001).  In 
addition, using search paradigms with visual materials (pictures), longer latencies have been 
reported for correct responses to distractors than targets (Czernochowski, 2005; Hockley, 
1984; Kunar, Rich, & Wolfe, 2010), such that the phenomenon appears to have cross-modal 
relevance.  From the present perspective, in explaining these differences one needs to 
consider the markedness dimension (Hamilton & Deese, 1971); that is, the fact that correct 
yes-responses are generated at the unmarked end of the dimension (“member”), whereas 
correct no-responses are generated at the marked end (“nonmember”).  In general, making a 
judgment or a decision at the marked end of a dimension has been shown to be more difficult 
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than at the unmarked end of the dimension (Schriefers, 1990; Schubert, 2005; van der Schoot 
et al., 2009).  It has been argued that working at the marked end might involve more elaborate 
thinking with the potential to mask the influence of any spatial input. In the context of 
sentence comprehension, Sherman (1973, 1976) argued that processing at the marked end 
imposes more cognitive load than at the unmarked end because marked stimuli are often 
treated as a negation of the unmarked version which induces additional load.  Also, negation 
is usually conceived as an operator that draws the reasoning focus away from the concept in 
question, and reduces its accessibility (Lea & Mulligan, 2001; MacDonald & Just, 1989; 
Sanford, Moxey, & Paterson, 1996; Kaup & Zwaan, 2003).  Finally, as mentioned above, in 
our own research (von Hecker et al., 2016, Experiment 4b) we found a left-anchoring bias 
when rank judgments had to be made on pairs from a series of “taller” object (unmarked end, 
positive magnitude), but no spatial effect at all when judgments had to be made on “shorter” 
objects (marked end, lack of magnitude; see Schubert, 2005, for similar asymmetries).   
The present experiment, allowing us to examine target and distractor words in isolation, 
can address the question of symmetry between stimulus categories.  We assume that once a 
stimulus is presented, participants will mentally position it either on the left (target) or on the 
right (distractor).  As such, when representing the stimulus at the unmarked end of the 
dimension, discrimination between congruent versus incongruent positioning of the response 
options will unfold more efficiently (faster), compared to a stimulus representation at the 
marked end where processing is more difficult (and slower).  Therefore, in terms of an 
alternative, asymmetric prediction for target versus distractor stimuli, we expect an 
interaction between type of category and side of response:  For target category words 
(working at the unmarked end of the dimension), participants should be quicker making a 
correct response with their left hand than with their right hand.  In contrast, for distractor 
category words (working at the marked end), we expect any spatial effect to be minimized or 
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non-existent for the reasons explained above.  Moreover, if the markedness argument is 
correct, then trials with distractor category words (marked end) should exhibit longer 
response times overall than trials with target category words (unmarked end).  
Method 
Participants 
Fourty-five undergraduate students from the University of Freiburg (32 female, 13 
male, mean age = 24.6 years) took part in the experiment, all with German-spoken 
backgrounds. They received course credit or €5.00 for their participation.  No participant was 
excluded.  
Materials  
The same word pool was used as in Experiment 2.  Five experimental blocks were used, 
and in each block, the assignment of materials, selection of categories etc. was identical to 
Experiment 2. 
Procedure 
After reading instructions, participants were seated approximately 60 cm in front of the 
computer screen.  Each block started directly with a test phase.  In each test phase, 20 target 
category words, and 20 distractor category words were presented individually, one in each 
trial, in a random sequence, with the category name (e.g., “furniture”) being constantly 
displayed in the upper left corner of the screen, as reminder.  Participants were asked to 
indicate as quickly and accurately as possible, whether the word on the screen was an 
exemplar of the target category, or not.  Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation 
cross in the center of the screen, for 800 ms.  After this, the stimulus word was presented 
centrally for an open response interval.  Along with it, and 7 cm below the word at two lateral 
positions 3 cm to the left and 3 cm to the right of the screen center, the words “YES” and 
“NO”, or, alternatively “NO” and “YES”, one of these arrangements randomly assigned to 
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each block, were displayed as response cues (see Figure 2).  Participants had to use the 
marked horizontal arrow keys to make their response in accordance with the arrangement of 
the response cues.  Care was taken that the forefingers of both hands (left hand for left, right 
hand for right) were always used to operate the two directional keys.  
All other presentation modalities and response options were the same as in Experiment 
2.  Between blocks, four easy arithmetic problems were presented as in Experiment 1 and 2.  
The experiment lasted between 20 and 25 minutes, including debriefing.  
Results 
Accuracy 
The overall error level (i.e., pressing the incorrect key) was 5%, across all participants 
and all test trials.  The final model used for analysis contained fixed effects for block (1,…, 
5), orientation of response options (“YES-NO” vs. “NO-YES”), category (target vs. 
distractor) as well as the interactions of these factors.  No significant effects emerged.  
Response latencies  
For correct responses, latency data were trimmed in the same way as in Experiment 1 
and 2. The linear mixed model used for the analysis had the same fixed effect structure as the 
one just reported for accuracy.  There was a significant effect of block, F(4, 55.58) = 8.04;
p < .0001, with responses becoming faster from block 1 through block 5, again reflecting a 
practice effect (MBlock 1 = 856 ms, MBlock 2 = 838 ms, MBlock 3 = 820 ms, MBlock 4 = 814 ms, 
MBlock 5 = 792 ms).  Second, a significant category effect, F(1, 59.99) = 45.74; p < .0001,  
revealed that words from the target category were associated with faster correct responses 
than words from the distractor category (MTarget = 801 ms, vs. MDistractor = 848 ms).  Crucially, 
the interaction between orientation of response options and category was significant, F(1, 
7863.86) = 4.45; p = .03, see Figure 3.  According to a subsequent simple effects analysis, 
correct responses to target category words were given quicker with the left hand than with the 
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right hand (Mleft = 792 ms, vs. Mright = 808 ms; z = -2.734, p = .006, Cohen’s d = .19), 
whereas for distractor category words, there was no difference (Mleft = 849 ms, vs. Mright = 
846 ms; z = .199, p = .84).  No further effects were significant.  We did not analyse the 
latencies of trials with incorrect responses because of the overall infrequency of errors. 
 
Discussion 
Using a stimulus-response compatibility paradigm, this experiment examined words 
from target and distractor categories in isolation, which enabled us to examine the unmarked 
and marked ends of the membership dimension separately.  Response times overall were 
shorter than in the previous two experiments in which participants had to deal with four 
response options, as opposed to only two in the present case.  Participants were quicker 
making a correct response with their left hand than with their right hand in target category 
trials.  In contrast, they did not exhibit any difference in response speed between their hands 
when correctly responding to a distractor category trial.  Overall, they were slower in 
distractor than in target category trials.  This pattern supports the view that markedness does 
play a role in the processes under study.  At the unmarked end of the dimension (“member”) 
a spatial simulation of the type “positive assignment to category means left” can be observed 
with isolated stimuli.  At the marked end (“nonmember”) the same is not the case.  For target 
category words, the simple effect (17 ms difference, d = .19) is small, and considerably 
smaller than the main effect associated with category type (48 ms difference, d = .51) such 
that one may assume that the factors affecting processing at the marked end (see above) may 
have obscured apotentially existing, symmetric effect of spatial congruence for distractor 
category words.  
To the extent that one accepts the different paradigms (Experiments 1 and 2 versus the 
present experiment) to be addressing, in essence, the same phenomenon, the present 
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experiment can help clarify a further concern with respect to internal validity.  In 
Experiments 1 and 2, one may argue that at least part of the reported left-anchoring effect 
might be due to a general motor tendency to respond faster when a stimulus is shown on the 
left side than on the right (1).  Alternatively, an automatic tendency might exist to press left 
that facilitates left responses when they are appropriate and sometimes captures the response 
when a right response would have been appropriate (2).   If (1) was true, only response speed 
as such could be affected but not accuracy, so the accuracy effects in Experiment 2 would 
remain unexplained, as would the interaction with category, as observed in the present 
experiment.  The second possibility (2) can indeed explain the accuracy effect, but not the 
present interaction with stimulus category.  Moreover, both alternative explanations predict a 
general advantage for pressing the left key which runs counter the evidence:  The vast 
majority of all participants in Experiments 1-3 were right-dominant-handers, and with 
bilateral reaction times to visual stimuli, responses by the dominant hand are usually made 
significantly faster than by the non-dominant hand (Kerr, Mingay, & Elithorn, 1963, or, for a 
more recent null result, see Hiraoka et al., 2018).   As to the present body of evidence, in 
Experiment 1 there was no significant difference in left versus right response latency for 
incorrect responses (19 ms), compared with a left-side advantage for correct responses (176 
ms), which counts against a general “left = fast” explanation; however, this interaction is not 
significant.  More convincingly, as hinted above, the present experiment provides evidence 
for left-anchoring only for target category words but not for distractor category words.  This 
speaks against an overall explanation in terms of faster left-responses.  The pattern overall 
lends support to an explanation based on congruence versus incongruence between an 
existing mental representation of “membership” and the required response mapping in each 
trial.   
Experiment 4a: Category Discrimination  
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(Replication with Response Key Labels Changed) 
The aim of this experiment was a replication of Experiment 2, to rule out the possibility 
that the standard word ordering of yes-no (rather than no-yes) would be an alternative 
explanation for the results of Experiment 2.  In that experiment, the correct answer to targets 
(category members) was always "yes" whereas the correct answer to nontargets 
(nonmembers) was always "no".  If participants imagined "yes" before, or left of, "no", then 
the faster reactions to targets on the left side, with the yes-no response key positioned on the 
left, thereby making the assumed word order salient only for a left-key response but not for a 
right-key response, could potentially be explained by the canonical word order of yes and no.  
The rationale now employed for Experiment 4a is that if response labels were changed into 
“member” and “others”, replacing “yes” and “no”, results should show convergence with 
those from Experiment 2 for our main hypothesis to be supported.   
Another aim of Experiment 4a was to provide test power at an adequate level given the 
effect size obtained in Experiment 2, as d = .25.  For one-tailed testing, with Type-I-  and 
Type-II -errors fixed at α = .05 and β = .2, this yielded a required sample size of n =  101 
(GPower, see Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  This method can be seen as 
conservative because the linear mixed model analyses used here have more test power than 
the simple t-test that underlies the GPower analysis.  
Method 
Participants 
101 undergraduate students from the University of Freiburg (75 female, 26 male, mean 
age = 23.8 years) took part in the experiment, all with German-spoken backgrounds. They 
received course credits or €5.00 for their participation.  One participant was excluded for data 




All methodology was identical to Experiment 26, except that the response labels used in 
this experiment were the German words “Mitglied-Mitglied”, “Andere-Andere”, “Mitglied-
Andere”, and “Andere-Mitglied”, with Mitglied (Member) meaning a target category 
instance, and Andere (Others) a distractor category instance.  The experiment lasted between 
20 and 25 min, including debriefing.  
Results 
Accuracy 
The overall error level (i.e., pressing the incorrect key) was 7%, across all participants 
and all test pairs in all blocks.  For the present analysis, only trials involving “target – 
distractor” and “distractor – target” trials were considered.  The same effect structure as in 
Experiment 2 was used for the final model.  There was a significant fixed factor effect for 
side of target category word, χ2(1) = 4.07; p = .04, indicating that responses were more 
accurate when the target category word was shown on the left side (Mtarget left  = .95) compared 
to the right side in a pair (Mtarget right  = .93).  No other significant effects emerged.  
Response latencies  
For correct responses, latency data were trimmed in the same way as before, and the 
final linear mixed model used for the analyses had the same fixed effect structure as in 
Experiment 2.  In this model, a significant main effect occurred for block, F(4, 
92.55) = 14.05; p < .001, showing that responses became faster from Block 1 through Block 
5, reflecting a practice effect (MBlock 1 = 1530 ms, MBlock 2 = 1415 ms, MBlock 3 = 1376 ms, 
MBlock 4 = 1324 ms, MBlock 5 = 1292 ms).  Crucially, the effect of side of category word was 
also significant, F(1, 100.22) = 5.17; p = .03, Cohen’s d = .09 (Mtarget left  = 1367 ms; Mtarget 
right  = 1406 ms).  No further effects were significant.  Again, latencies of trials with incorrect 
responses were not analysed because of the overall infrequency of errors. 
Control via vertical response configuration 
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Again, we looked into the possibility that the vertical dimension could provide an equal 
scaffold for responding.  Latencies associated with correct responses to “target-target” and 
“distractor-distractor” responses (for which the response keys were vertically arranged) were 
therefore analysed in a similar linear mixed model as above.  There were three significant 
effects.  Firstly, the block factor, F(4,91.48) = 15.06; p < .001, indicated a practice effect in 
terms of responses becoming faster from the first block (Mblock 1  = 1597 ms) to the last block 
(Mblock 5  = 1396 ms).  Secondly, a significant effect of the counterbalancing factor, 
F(1,97.61) = 9.48; p = .003, revealed faster responses when the “target-target” response 
option was allocated to the UP arrow key (MUP  = 1380 ms), as compared to the DOWN 
arrow key (MDOWN  = 1546 ms).  Thirdly, the triple interaction between the counterbalancing 
factor, block, and type of pair was significant, F(4,3742.95) = 3.49; p = .008, which was, 
upon inspection of the means, probably due to the practice effect appearing more pronounced 
for whatever type of pair was allocated to the UP arrow key.  No further effects were 
significant.  In particular, the interaction between the counterbalancing factor and type of pair 
was again insignificant, F(1,96.31) = .56; p = .46.  This interaction would be expected under 
the assumption that either the upper position of the response key was to generate quicker 
responding in general, or that a metaphorical blending with respect to target and distractor 
categories, and with respect to the “target-target” and “distractor-distractor” stimuli, did 
happen in the vertical dimension.   
Discussion 
By means of changing response labels from yes – no to member – others, Experiment 
4a, now using a sample size designed to replicate the effect found in Experiment 2 with 
sufficient test power, demonstrated that this effect cannot be explained by the canonical word 
order of yes and no.  Processing advantages for trials in which the target category member 
was presented left compared to right also appeared in a setting where response options were 
30 
 
now labelled as member versus others which two words are assumed to not stand in any 
culturally shaped order a priori and therefore do not imply any spatial configuration amongst 
each other per se, for participants used to read and write from left to right.  The crucial effect 
in Experiment 4a emerged for accuracies, as well as for latencies.  Our previous results on 
spatial biases (left anchoring of linear orders, von Hecker et al., 2016, see above) did show 
that the target effects indicative of the processing bias would mostly occur in latencies, but 
sometimes also in accuracies and not latencies, or in both types of DVs.   
 
Experiment 4b: Category Discrimination  
(Replication of Experiment 4a with target category label centered and changed 
instructions) 
In Experiments 2, 3, and 4a we used category labels to indicate the target category in 
each block.  These labels were presented in the left upper corner of the screen in all three 
experiments, which could have constituted a spatial cue for response generation.  The present 
experiment was conducted as an additional replication of the target effect under a condition 
where the spatial position of that indicative label (which was useful as response aid as the 
target category was different in each block) could not serve as a cue for responding.  To this 
end, the target category label was now centered on the display during blocks, for the label to 
have no lateral implication by its position on the screen.   
We also attempted to change instructions to a most conservative wording in terms of 
counteracting any primacy implications for the “membership” case (as opposed to 
“nonmember”) that could stem from the verbal delivery of instructions, in terms of the 
sequence of wording.  
As in Experiment 4a, participant recruitment aimed at a test power commensurate to the 





101 undergraduate students from the University of Freiburg (53 female, 48 male, mean 
age = 24.8 years) took part in the experiment, all with German-spoken backgrounds. They 
received course credits or €5.00 for their participation.   
Materials and Procedure 
All methodology was identical to Experiment 4a, except that in each block, the label  
indicating the target category was placed in the center of the screen.  Also different from 
Experiment 4a, we used a new set of instructions which explicitly gave the nonmembership 
case spatial and temporal primacy within the sequence of terms used in the wording.  The 
particular parts of the instructions as changed vis-à-vis Experiment 4a now read as follows 
(translated from German, and note the sequence of mentioning between “others” and 
“member”): 
“In this experiment you will be presented with words that may be either nonmembers 
(‘others’) or members (‘member’) of a given target category (e.g., ‘buildings’).  You will be 
shown 20 pairs of such words. One of the two words in a pair could be a nonmember, or both 
words could be nonmembers, or none of them.  On the screen you will see four response 
options, corresponding to the four direction arrow keys.  Within these options, ‘others’ means 
that the word does not belong to the target category whereas ‘m mber’ means that the word 
belongs to the target category.”   The experiment lasted between 20 and 25 min, including 
debriefing.  
Results and Discussion 
Accuracy 
The overall error level (i.e., pressing the incorrect key) was 6%, across all participants 
and all test pairs in all blocks, after exclusion of three participants by boxplot analysis, for 
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low overall accuracy.  For the present analysis, only trials involving “target – distractor” and 
“distractor – target” trials were considered.  The same effect structure as in Experiment 4a 
was used for the final model.  There was a significant fixed factor effect for side of target 
category word, χ2(1) = 5.89; p = .02, indicating that responses were more accurate when the 
target category word was shown on the left side (Mtarget left  = .96) compared to the right side 
in a pair (Mtarget right  = .95).  No other significant effects emerged.  
Response latencies  
For correct responses, latency data were trimmed in the same way as before, and the 
final linear mixed model used for the analyses had the same fixed effect structure as in 
Experiment 4a.  In this model, a significant main effect occurred for block, F(4, 
95.39) = 19.31; p < .001, showing that responses became faster from Block 1 through Block 
5, reflecting a practice effect (MBlock 1 = 1650 ms, MBlock 2 = 1501 ms, MBlock 3 = 1440 ms, 
MBlock 4 = 1399 ms, MBlock 5 = 1360 ms).  Crucially, the effect of side of category word was 
also significant, F(1, 97.76) = 4.34; p = .04, Cohen’s d = .06 (Mtarget left  = 1456 ms; Mtarget right  
= 1484 ms).  Additionally, there was a significant three-way interaction showing that the 
practice effect in the counterbalancing group that responded to “target – target” with “arrow 
up” was more pronouned than in the group that responded to “target – target” with “arrow 
down”, but only for those trials that had the target category showing on the right, F(4, 
3886.82) = 3.02; p = .02.  Latencies of trials with incorrect responses were not analysed 
because of the overall infrequency of errors. 
Control via vertical response configuration 
Again, we looked into the possibility that the vertical dimension could provide an equal 
scaffold for responding.  Latencies associated with correct responses to “target-target” and 
“distractor-distractor” responses (for which the response keys were vertically arranged) were 
analysed in a similar linear mixed model as above.  There were three significant effects.  
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Firstly, the block factor, F(4,92.86) = 18.40; p < .001, indicated a practice effect in terms of 
responses becoming faster from the first block (Mblock 1  = 1710 ms) to the last block (Mblock 5  
= 1446 ms).  Secondly, a significant effect of the counterbalancing factor, F(1,96.00) = 5.31; 
p = .02, revealed faster responses when the “target-target” response option was allocated to 
the UP arrow key (MUP  = 1452 ms), as compared to the DOWN arrow key (MDOWN  = 1602 
ms).  Thirdly, the triple interaction between the counterbalancing factor, block, and type of 
pair was significant, F(4,3838.04) = 3.37; p = .009, which was, upon inspection of the means, 
probably due to the practice effect appearing more pronounced for whatever type of pair was 
allocated to the DOWN arrow key.  No further effects were significant.  In particular, the 
interaction between the counterbalancing factor and type of pair was again insignificant, 
F(1,3839.72) = .88; p = .35.  This interaction would be expected under the assumption that 
either the upper position of the response key was to generate quicker responding in general, 
or that a metaphorical blending with respect to target and distractor categories, and with 
respect to the “target-target” and “distractor-distractor” stimuli, did happen in the vertical 
dimension.   
By means of changing the position of the target category labels per block from the left 
upper corner of the screen (in previous experiments) to upper center screen (in the present 
experiment) we demonstrated that the left spatial position of the label was unlikely to have 
influenced the previous pattern of results, as the data from the present experiment very 
closely matched those from Experiment 4a.  The crucial effect emerged for accuracies, as 
well as for latencies, replicating the pattern from Experiment 4a.  Participants were more 
correct and responded faster in trials that presented the category member on the left side  as 
compared to the right side, in a pair of test stimuli.  Furthermore, these results were obtained 
under instructions that deliberately gave spatial and temporal primacy to the 
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“nonmembership” case, in terms of the sequence of wording instructions, such that the 
paradigm variant used here constitues a strongly conservative test of our assumptions.  
 
Experiment 5a: Spontaneous category assignment 
A simple sorting task was chosen to directly test the assumption that people envisage 
target categories (members) to the left of non-target categories (nonmember).  This was 
deemed an incremental step to our argument because it is desirable to show that a 
psychological mechanism, as theoretically postulated and as demonstrated in the context of 
small effect sizes and detected via response times in rigorous laboratory arrangements, would 
also have more straightforwardly observable, behavioural consequences.  As in all previous 
experiments reported here, the basic hypothesis is that when it comes to assign a stimulus to a 
given category as either member or nonmember, Western participants would spatially 
simulate membership on the left side and nonmembership on the right side, based on a 
blending of primacy (member is unmarked) with dimensional dominance.   
Method 
This experiment was conducted at Cardiff, UK.  The procedures were approved by the 
Ethics Committee at the School of Psychology, Cardiff University.  All participants gave 
written consent and were formally debriefed.  
Participants 
Fifty undergraduate students (all female, mean age = 19.4 years) took part in the 
experiment.  They received course credit for their participation.  We sampled participants for 
individual sessions from the student population at Cardiff University, exclusively with left-to-
right reading/writing habit.  No participant was excluded.   
Materials and Procedure 
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We prepared 80 cards of 5.5cm (width) x 3cm (height) to form two decks of 40 cards, 
A and B.  In each deck there were 20 cards representing exemplars of the target category, and 
2x10 cards representing exemplars of two distractor categories.  In deck A animal was target 
with musical instrument and furniture as distractor categories; in deck B sports discipline was 
target with clothes and fruit being distractor categories.  For each experimental session, the 
participant was presented with either deck A or B, according to an odd/even alternation with 
participant number.  Each session started with all cards from the three categories being 
presented as an unsorted heap in front of the participant, at a distance of approx. 30 cm.  The 
participant was then given a target category (e.g., “animal”) and asked to sort the cards from 
the heap into two new, separate heaps closer to her/himself, as approx. 10 cm in front.  The 
locations of the new heaps were suggested to be on both sides of a cardboard stripe that was 
laid directly in front as a central borderline, dividing a left and a right subspace on the table.  
The following instructions were given for deck A, avoiding any reference to “left” or “right”:  
“This is a sorting task. I need you to make two heaps of cards out of those cards lying in front 
of you. Please put all cards with words describing animals on one side, and the remaining 
cards on the other side.“  Analogous instructions were provided for deck B, referring to 
“sports discipline” as target category. The duration of the experiment varied slightly between 
participants but was mostly within a few minutes, as procedures were terminated at the point 
in time at which it was clearly established by the participant, what sides each of the two heaps 
would occupy (see below).  
Results and Discussion 
The rationale for sequential testing (Ghosh & Sen, 1991; Wald, 1947) was followed.  
According to this methodology, sample size is not pre-specified.  Rather, observations (here 
equivalent to an experimental session with one participant) are collected one at a time.  An 
observation consisted in a participant arranging for the heap corresponding to the target 
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category either to be on the left or on the right side of the cardboard divider.  An individual 
session was terminated when the two new heaps had been clearly established, such that not 
all cards from the unsorted heap had to be exhaustively sorted.  After each session, we 
calculated the Wald parameters with respect to acceptance and rejection boundaries for H1 
and H0 (Bernoulli-distribution), yielding a decision between the three alternatives of  a) reject 
H0 and accept H1, b) retain H0, or c) run another session.  The R package SPRT (Bottine, 
2015) was used, and we specified, as null hypothesis, H0 p=.5, and as alternative hypothesis 
H1 p=.7, indicating a preference for placing the target category heap left.  Type-I-  and Type-
II -errors were fixed at α = .05 and β = .2, for a test power of  1-β = .8.  Procedures were 
terminated after the 50st participant, with all 49 previous sessions having had led to the Wald-
decision of “run another session”.  At that point, 35 participants had placed the target 
category heap on the left side of the divider, and the statistical decision upon running the 
Wald test was to reject H0 and accept H1.  The results of this experiment thus provided 
evidence for a spontaneous placement of category members to the left of nonmembers in our 
student population.  
Experiment 5b: Spontaneous category assignment with changed instructions 
Method 
Eighty-two undergraduate students (71 female, 11 male, mean age = 19.6 years) took 
part in the experiment.  They received course credit for their participation.  We sampled 
participants for individual sessions from the student population at Cardiff University, 
exclusively with left-to-right reading/writing habit.  No participant was excluded.   
The above experiment was replicated with two instructional variants.  We wanted to 
test whether spontaneous sorting behaviour would replicate the left-bias in category 
assignment when spatial/temporal primacy of instructional wording was counterbalanced.  
Thus, two counterbalancing conditions were created that varied only in the instruction given 
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to participants.  In condition 1, they were told: “You are to sort these cards into two heaps, 
one for non-members and one for members of a certain target category. The target category is 
‘animals’ (‘sports disciplines’).”  Note that the negative concept of nonmember has 
spatial/temporal primacy on the instruction sheet.   Instructions for condition 2 read as 
follows:  “You are to sort these cards into two heaps, one for members and one for non-
members of a certain target category. The target category is ‘animals’ (‘sports disciplines’).”  
In this case, the positive concept of member has spatial/temporal primacy in terms of reading 
the instructions.  We retained from Experiment 5a decks A and B as representing two 
different kinds of noun materials, so that in following sequential testing sessions, the four 
combinations of conditions (1 or 2) and decks (A or B) were rotated in a counterbalanced 
way through increasing participant numbers.  All other methods and procedures were the 
same as in Experiment 5a. 
Results and Discussion 
Procedures were terminated after the 82nd participant, with all 81 previous sessions 
having had led to the Wald-decision of “run another session”.  At that point, 52 participants 
had placed the target category heap on the left side of the divider, and the statistical decision 
upon running the Wald test was to reject H0 and accept H1.  In terms of the instructional 
variants made in this experiment, this means that in condition 1, administered to N=42 
participants, 25 of them created the heap for animals/sports disciplines on the left side, 
whereas in condition 2, administered to N=40 participants, 27 made the same lateral decision. 
Conclusively, spontaneous placement of category members to the left of nonmembers, as 
captured in this card-sorting paradigm, did not vary as a function of instructional wording 
between Experiments 5a and 5b.  The spatial representations of category membership as left, 
as opposed to nonmembership as right, in Western participants, can express itself in 
straightforward behavioural observations.  The apparent left-sorting tendency for “members” 
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does not seem to be influenced by potential spatial or temporal primacy as derived from the 
reading of instructions.    
General Discussion 
For humans, sensorimotor experiences, that is, experiences involving action in physical 
space, play an important role in the acquisition of reasoning abilities.  More complex forms 
of knowledge are based on, and linked to, previously encountered spatial concepts (Clark, 
1973; Niedenthal et al., 2005; Tomasello, 2009; Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009).  For 
example, abstract notions of animacy, sequential action, or containment are rooted in early 
perceptual experiences in space that are later generalised as analog representations, and made 
available for domain-unspecific use (Mandler, 1992; Barsalou, 1999).  As a consequence, 
abstract thought, although it may not be specifically of spatial content, may still be associated 
with spatial content, or spatial simulations (Barsalou, 2003).  This is reflected in the general 
notion of mental space (Huttenlocher, 1968), but also in findings, for example, concerning 
the representation of social power (Schubert, 2005), or motor implications and the time line 
(SNARC effect, Chatterjee, 2001).  At the most general level, the question asked in the 
present paper is to what extent such spatial representations are involved in the case of an even 
more abstract, but quite fundamental, cognitive operation, that is, the assignment of an entity 
(which can be a concrete, perceived object or itself an abstract concept under consideration) 
to a superordinate conceptual category.   
In seven experiments, using different paradigms, we presented evidence in support of 
the idea that category membership is spatially represented as a binary dimension with 
“member” mentally positioned left, and “nonmember” positioned right; that is, people who 
have been raised with left-to right reading/writing background.  Using a modified 2AFC 
paradigm, Experiment 1 showed faster responding to indicate the location of an old word on 
the screen when the display of the old word was on the left within a pair of horizontally 
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arranged words.  Experiments 2 and 4 (a, b) replicated this pattern using materials that did not 
differ in memory strength, or familiarity, between stimuli with membership versus not, in the 
target category.  Experiment 3 yielded convergent results using a stimulus-response 
compatibility paradigm.  Participants were faster when responding with their left hand than 
with their right hand in target category trials.  In contrast, there was no difference in response 
times between both hands when correctly responding to a distractor category trial.  Finally, 
using a spontaneous sorting task in Experiment 5 (a, b) we demonstrated that a psychological 
mechanism, as theoretically postulated and as demonstrated in the context of relatively small 
effect sizes and detected via response times in rigorous laboratory arrangements, would also 
have more straightforwardly observable, behavioural consequences.   
To explain this pattern, two assumptions are made.  Firstly, in analogy to current 
explanations of the time line (Gevers et al., 2003), the number line (Chatterjee, 2001; Zebian, 
2005), the spatial agency bias (Suitner & Maass, 2016), and the construction of abstract 
orders (von Hecker et al., 2016), we submit that there is a tendency to use the learned 
reading/writing habit as a scaffold for determining the origin of an ordered dimension in 
mental space (Lourenco & Longo, 2010).  Secondly, the dimension is assumed to have 
exactly two ordered levels, that is, “member” (with high primacy and located at the origin, 
that is, on the left side, see Introduction), and “nonmember” with low primacy, and located 
on the right side.  The rationale for “member” to be placed to the left of “nonmember” is 
based on the notion of metaphoric blending (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Pecher et al., 2010).  
Blending means that conceptual integration takes place in the service of construction of new 
meaning and mental representations (see Casasanto, 2009; Coulson & Oakley, 2005).  
Assuming that primacy on the membership dimension is fixed to be high on the left and low 
on the right (by virtue of the sequential action schema derived from reading/writing 
proceeding from left to right), blending assumes in addition that the meaning of “member”, 
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representing a positive entity/magnitude, is integrated with high primacy to yield a placement 
on the left side, in contrast to “nonmember” which is positioned on the right side.   
Note that the present set of results is difficult to explain on the basis of an activated 
schema of sequential action alone (from left to right), that is, without making the blending 
assumption.  According to a “sequential action alone” assumption, faster responding on the 
left side is generally expected, irrespective of stimulus condition, and irrespective of whether 
or not a response was correct.  Looking at incorrect trials in Experiment 1 we do not find a 
difference in key pressing time between responses on the left and right side, meaning that 
participants’ response speed is unlikely to be determined by a sequential action schema alone, 
that is, without considering the match/mismatch between the perceived membership values of 
the two stimuli on the screen and in mental space.  Also, Experiment 3 showed that, in target 
category trials, participants responded faster with their left hand than with their right hand 
when making a correct response.  However, their response speed did not differ between both 
hands when correctly responding to a distractor category trial.  This pattern, as well, speaks 
against a “left = fast” tendency as overall explanation.  Instead, the pattern gives support to 
the idea that at the unmarked end of the category membership dimension (see Hamilton & 
Deese, 1971), that is, in the positive case of “member”, the blend between the positive 
dimensional asset (see above) and primacy yields a congruence between the lateral position 
in mental space where the target is being placed onto (“member”=left), and the side of the 
responding hand (in trials where the “YES”-response had to be made with the left hand).   
Correspondingly, in trials requiring a “YES”-response to be made with the right hand, there 
is incongruence.  In other words, for positive target category instances, the difference 
between congruence and incongruence is rooted in the blending of the dimensional asset 
(“member”) with dimensional primacy (“left”), thereby causing “positive membership” to be 
positioned left.   In contrast, for stimuli with no membership in the target category, a correct 
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response had to be made at the marked end of the dimension, which is associated with 
processing disadvantages (Schriefers, 1990; Schubert, 2005; van der Schoot et al., 2009).  
This meant longer response times overall as compared to responding at the unmarked end, 
such that a symmetric difference, that is, a possible right-hand advantage in responding as a 
result of spatial congruence between “nonmember” and “right”, was most likely obscured.   
Another alternative explanation to be addressed is polarity correspondence.  The 
literature on stimulus-response-compatibility has developed the concept of polarity 
correspondence (PC) to explain spatial mapping effects, mostly in binary classification tasks 
in which stimuli have to be classified into one of two response categories (for an overview 
see Proctor & Cho, 2006). The basic idea here is that the two conceptual alternatives in a 
given dimension (e.g., old–young) are coded as plus and minus, whereby the assignments of 
these codes typically follow the logic of linguistic markedness.  For example, in old–young, 
the adjective old is plus-coded because it neutralizes to describe the dimension whereas 
young is minus-coded because it does not (Lakens, 2012). Spatial mapping effects are 
explained in the PC framework by assuming that not only stimuli, but also responses are 
plus/minus-coded; such that, for example an up-response key would be plus-coded as 
opposed to a down-key being minus-coded, as well as a right-response key being plus-coded 
as opposed to a left-response key being minus-coded (Proctor & Cho, 2006; Lakens, 2012). 
Responses should then meet interference and occur with longer latencies when stimulus-code 
and response-code are different as compared with when they are the same.  Polarity 
correspondence, as we see it, has difficulties explaining the present results.  With respect to 
Experiments 1 and 2 it is difficult to reconcile with previous research on which the polarity 
correspondence framework is erected, that “left” (as side of presentation) would have to be 
plus-coded (instead of “right”) to yield correspondence with the plus-coded “member” 
(versus the minus-coded “nonmember”).  Similarly, with respect to Experiment 3, it is not 
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clear why responding with the left hand (instead of the right hand) should be plus-coded to 
yield correspondence with “member”.  The easier explanation in these cases is that, according 
to the present framework, compatibility (or correspondence, or a lack thereof) exists not 
between two particular codes but between (a) the spatial mental representation of the 
membership dimension and (b) the perceptual spatial input on the screen (or, the spatial 
features of the motor response).   
With respect to theories of embodiment, it is important to highlight that we are not 
advocating a strong embodiment formulation (see Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002 for this 
terminology).  According to such a view, activation is postulated to occur in relevant 
sensorimotor areas in the brain, upon activating a certain type of cognitive activity.  To use an 
example by Casasanto and Gijssels (2015) whose paper focuses on this issue, for a strong 
view of embodiment to be empirically supported for a metaphor like “Knowing is Seeing”, 
one would have to show activation of visual cortex areas in an experimental situation that 
activates an operationalised instance of “knowing”.   As Casasanto and Gijssels (2015) argue, 
so far there exists too little evidence of just this quality as to be in a position of making such a 
strong embodiment claim.  In the present case, the strong claim would amount to be able to 
show that category assignment as a cognitive activity is directly associated with sensorimotor 
areas in the brain known to be crucially involved in spatial behaviour in terms of movement 
or vision.  Besides such evidence being outside the empirical scope of the present paper, the 
strong claim does not correspond to our position in the first place.  Instead, in light of the 
present data we argue for a mild embodiment view (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002).  This is to 
say that the roots of the mental representation of dimensional primacy may originate in the 
physical experiences of some action dynamic (reading/writing).  But its application later on, 
that is, after consolidation upon early learning, proceeds largely independent of physical 
parameters, including presentational conditions.  The milder view therefore postulates mental 
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space to be an abstraction from its physical origins, which turns space into a universally 
versatile cognitive tool, applicable in many ways and contexts.  Interestingly, the 
embodiment literature sometimes asserts a version of just this argument by emphasizing that 
“image schemas” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) may have been acquired by perceptuo-motor 
experiences, but then “abstracted away from the particulars of those experiences” (Casasanto 
& Gijssels, 2015, p. 335).  The point here is also that activation of such abstracted schemas 
seems to show correlated brain activity in modality-nonspecific areas, such as the 
intraparietal sulcus (Quadflieg, et al., 2011) and other areas of the parietal lobe (Citron & 
Goldberg, 2014).  These areas have been associated with spatial processing and binary 
decision making, as mentioned earlier (see Vickery & Jiang, 2009; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009).  
Our own research has shown that spatial effects in inferential reasoning processes are tightly 
connected to bold-response effects in parietal areas (Hinton, Dymond, von Hecker, & Evans, 
2010).  These results confirm the mild view of embodiment insofar as spatially interpretable 
behavioral effects (the “symbolic distance effect”, see Hinton et al., 2010) are associated with 
activation differences in a modality-nonspecific area of the brain, that is, the parietal lobe.  
 
Implications 
We mentioned above evidence for the parietal lobe contributions to brain activation 
during participants’ performance on the 2AFC paradigm, in the context of recognition 
memory tasks (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009).  Together with other findings on the functional 
overlap between decision making and spatial processing in the Inferior Parietal Lobule (IPL, 
see Andersen et al.,1985; Vickery & Jiang, 2009) the question arises to what extent the 
observed spatial effect, that is, the representation of category assignment in mental space, is 
just an accidental byproduct, or alternatively, a necessary constituent of the cognitive process.  
Some authors have proposed that functions supported by the parietal lobe are related to a 
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general simulation and magnitude comparison device (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Fias et al., 2003; 
Walsh, 2003, see also Dehaene et al., 1998), and others have argued that such a common 
mechanism would still not necessarily imply the existence of a common mental 
representation of magnitude (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008).  Without being able to provide a 
conclusive answer to this question yet, the present results at least support the notion that 
spatial simulation effects are indeed observable at the level of mental representation.  Note 
that our model has much in common with the model of agency representation as proposed by 
Suitner and Maass (e.g., 2016).   Like them, we assume sequential action to be represented as 
flowing from left to right, as an abstract derivation from reading/writing.  Different from their 
model, however, we additionally assume the blending mechanism as discussed above.  
Blending assures that not only the spatial position of the dimensional origin is fixed (=left), 
but that there is also a unique dimensional anchoring.  Just because primacy (as derived from 
reading/writing) is blended with dimensional dominance (as derived from semantics: 
“member” dominates “nonmember”), an anchoring constraint arises for the model in terms of 
“member” being placed at the dimensional origin, that is, on the left. 
Conclusion 
We demonstrated spatial effects associated with category assignment in simple decision 
tasks from different domains and paradigms (recognition memory, category discrimination, 
stimulus-response compatibility, spontaneous sorting).  Whilst it is not yet entirely clear what 
functional status these effects might have, and whether they are a necessary part of cognition 
in these tasks, their existence provokes ideas about possible explanations of functionality.  As 
such, spatial processing might functionally overlap with abstract reasoning at a fundamental 
level, as future research will have to further examine.  As well, we see potential in a unifying 
quality of the present assumptions.  In the area of ordered relations of abstract entities, spatial 
mental modelling has been thoroughly investigated, and theoretical links between magnitude 
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processing on an ordered dimension and spatial processing have been brought forward 
(Dehaene et al., 1993; DeSoto, London, & Handel, 1965; Holyoak & Patterson, 1981; Leth-
Steensen & Marley, 2000; Moyer & Bayer, 1976; Ouellet et al., 2010; Smith & Foos, 1975; 
von Hecker et al., 2013, 2016).  In all of these cases, the spatial simulation that is assumed to 
be constructed maps the pre-existing order relations as perceived in reality.  With category 
assignment, this is different because membership (or not) in a given category is per se 
information only at qualitative, not ordinal level.  What the present research shows is that 
even in this case, the general mechanisms postulated for stimuli at the ordinal level 
(determination of dimensional dominance between stimuli, modelling of sequential action, 
via reading/writing habits, blending) can be used to explain essential aspects of response 
generation.  It is possible to treat the binary, qualitative case of category assignment with the 
same theoretical tools as used in the specification of ordinal mental models, which we see as 
progress in unification.  
Context of the Research 
The ideas leading to this research originated in earlier work on the left-anchoring bias.  
We had found that rank orders on abstract dimensions of comparison, such as older or
stronger, had a tendency to be anchored with their maximum on the left side.  This finding 
was based on responses to binary decisions, that is, determining which of two stimuli was the 
dominant one in a horizontal display.  This led to the consideration that in essence, the left-
anchoring bias could be understood as a bias of categorisation.  By interpreting category 
membership as a dimension in mental space we do not take a strong embodiment position, in 
the sense that the representation of membership might have directly to do with physical 
experiences of space via motion or body posture.  Rather, we adopt a milder position (see 
Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), meaning that mental space, as it might have originated in, and 
solidified through, physical experience during early years of cognitive development, has 
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become an abstract tool in the mind of adults.  We believe that people use mental space for 
reasoning, that is, for representing abstract entities and the relations between them; and it is in 
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1        
“Conceptual Blending” is defined here, following the linguistic literature, as the 
integration of information from disparate domains.  When two concepts are blended, 
overlapping aspects of their individual meanings form the core of a new, enhanced, or 
pragmatically more useful, integrated meaning (see Coulson & Oakley, 2005; Casasanto, 





An adjective can be defined as unmarked when it neutralizes to describe the dimension, 
and as marked when it does not (Proctor & Cho, 2006).  In the cited experiment, older, richer, 
taller, smarter, stronger, and faster were used, each of which would, in its noncomparative 
form, describe the dimension in a neutral way, as opposed to their marked counterparts 
younger, poorer, shorter, dumber, weaker, and slower, which do not.  Hamilton and Deese 
(1971) demonstrated that people are reliably able to distinguish these two types of adjectives.  
 
3 
In the sample, three participants had extremely low accuracy levels, that is, they had 
produced more than 60% errors across all trials.  We calculated the same type of statistical 
models for accuracy and latency under exclusion of these three, and found equivalent 
statistical results.  The target effect of side of old word in the latency data was, in this case, at 
F(1,76.61) = 7.11; p = .009. 
 
4 
Since no vertical arrangement on the screen is used, the described procedure in the 
vertical dimension does not test congruence between the spatial positioning of stimuli and the 
mental representation of primacy (as our horizontal procedures in Experiments 1, 2 and 4 do), 
but tests the congruence of an assumed spatial representation of primacy (UP – DOWN) with 
spatial features of the response keys.  Insofar, this test is more germane to the rationale used 





Mean latency for correct responses = 3257 ms in a sample with overall mean = 1330 
ms, SD = 427 ms. 
 
6 
A minor methodological issue from Experiment 2 was removed.  In Experiment 2, 
“birds” and “animals” were not excluded from being paired as target and distractor categories 
in one and the same block.  This becomes an issue in a situation where “animals” is the target 
category.  If “birds” is target category, this is only problematic if there were birds amongst 
the animal instances.  Only the latter was found to be the case in two single trials from 
Experiment 2.  These trials were excluded and the data re-analysed with statistically identical 
results. In the present Experiment 4 the possibility that “animals” and “birds” could be paired 








Appendix A: Modelling of effects 
In order to determine which random effect structure to assume, we used generaliz d linear 
mixed models with random effects for participants for accuracy data, and linear mixed models 
with random effects for participants for the latency data. 
Model comparisons were performed in a two-steps procedure.  
Experiments 1 and 2: In the first step, we fitted three models for each data type (a1, a2 and a3 
for accuracy data, as well as t1, t2 and t3 for latency data).  All of these models had the same 
fixed effect structure, that is, group (counterbalancing variable for key positions assigned to 
“up” versus “down”, see text) presentation side of the target element and block, as well as 
their interactions.  All models had a random intercept for participants.  Models a3 and t had 
only this intercept, so these models are minimal.  Models a1 / t1 also had a random slope for 
block as function of participant, whereas a2 / tm2 had a random slope for side f target element 
instead.  These models were then compared using the Chi square difference statistic .  
Models of a given type 1 or 2 were compared with the corresponding model of type 3, the 
minimal model.  If there was a significant difference in fit, the particular type of random slope 
as specified in the non-minimal model under comparison was then retained for the final model, 
afinal, resp., tfinal.  In a second step, these final models were assembled and run in order to
evaluate the respective fixed effect structure from those models (see Jaeger, 2008).  This 
strategy thus considers random intercepts and random slopes for the main effects of the 
experimental design.  Models with more complex random effects structures (e.g., random 
slopes for interactions) could not be estimated in reasonable amounts of time.  The analys s 
employed the statistical programming language R (R Core Team, 2016), using the package 
lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and afex (Singmann, Bolker, Westfall, & 
Aust, 2018). 
Experiment 3:  The same general strategy as above was followed.  Different from the above, 
the fixed effect structure for the tested models was presentation side of th  target element, 
category (target vs. distractor, see text), and block, as well as their interactons.  Thus, as 
compared to the minimal models a4/t4 (only with random intercept for partici nts), models 
a1/t1 had a random slope for block as function of participant, a2/t2 had a random slope for 




EXPERIMENT 1:  
Accuracies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
a3   25  2546.1  2690.7  -1248.1    2496.1                          
a1          45  2560.9  2821.1  -1235.4    2470.9  25.243     20    0.1923 
a2  27  2549.7  2705.9  -1247.9    2495.7  0.3851      2     0.8248 
 






Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
t3  26  3559.8  3699.9  -1753.9    3507.8                              
t1  46  3515.3  3763.2  -1711.7    3423.3  84.472     20  6.751e-10 *** 
t2  28  3525.5  3676.3  -1734.7    3469.5  38.356      2   4.688e-09 *** 
tfinal:  Random slopes for block and side of target element, as a function of participants, are 
kept.   
 





EXPERIMENT 2:  
Accuracies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
a3   21  639.68  758.33  -298.84    597.68                          
a1      35  654.71  852.45  -292.36    584.71  12.971     14     0.5288 
a2  23  642.37  772.31  -298.19    596.37    1.311      2     0.5191 
afinal:  No random slopes as a function of participants were kept.  
 
Latencies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
t3  22  1325.8  1448.0  -640.88    1281.8                              
t1  36  1228.0  1428.1  -577.98    1156.0  125.79     14  < 2.2e-16 *** 
t2  24  1321.7  1455.2  -636.87    1273.7  8.0137      2    0.01819 * 
tfinal:  Random slopes for block and side of target element, as a function of participants, are 











EXPERIMENT 2a+2b, combined analysis:  
Accuracies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
a3  21  1564.8  1698.7  -761.38    1522.8 
a1      35  1572.8  1796.0  -751.39    1502.8  19.973     14      0.131 
a2  23  1559.9  1706.5  -756.94    1513.9  8.8851      2       0.01177 * 




Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
t3  22  3643.6  3781.5  -1799.8    3599.6                         
t1  36  3407.7  3633.5  -1667.9    3335.7  263.84     14  < 2.2e-16 *** 
t2  24  3601.6  3752.1  -1776.8    3553.6  45.996      2  1.028e-10 *** 
 
tfinal:  Random slopes for block and side of target element, as a function of participants, are 





EXPERIMENT 3:  
Accuracies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
a4   21  3269.0  3418.2  -1613.5    3227.0                              
a1      35  3229.5  3478.2  -1579.8    3159.5  67.431     14   5.612e-09 *** 
a2  23  3271.3  3434.7  -1612.6    3225.3  1.6969      2     0.4281 
a3  23  3260.5  3423.9  -1607.3    3214.5  12.445      2     0.001985 ** 
afinal:  Random slopes for block and category, as a function of participants, are kept.   
 
Latencies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
t4  22  -3406.8  -3252.7  1725.4   -3450.8                              
62 
 
t1  36  -3521.2  -3269.1  1796.6   -3593.2  142.47   14  < 2.2e-16*** 
t2  24  -3403.3  -3235.2  1725.6   -3451.3  0.4853      2     0.7845 
t3  24  -3440.2  -3272.1  1744.1   -3488.2  37.418      2  7.495e-09 *** 




EXPERIMENT 4a:  
Accuracies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
a3   21  1890.7  2027.6  -924.35    1848.7                          
a1      35 1893.2  2121.3  -911.62    1823.2  25.462     14    0.03027 * 
a2  23  1890.7  2040.6  -922.34    1844.7  4.0121      2     0.1345 
afinal:  Random slopes for block as a function of participants are kept.  
 
Latencies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
t3  22  4907.5  5048.2  -2431.8    4863.5                              
t1  36  4697.1  4927.4  -2312.6    4625.1  238.36     14  < 2.2e-16 *** 
t2  24  4844.3  4997.8  -2398.1    4796.3  67.207      2  2.548e-15 *** 
tfinal:  Random slopes for block and side of target element, as a function of participants, are 












EXPERIMENT 4b:  
Accuracies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
a3   21  1755.1  1891.6  -856.56    1713.1                         
a1      35  1755.8  1983.2  -842.93    1685.8  27.276     14    0.01772 * 
a2  23  1758.7  1908.2  -856.37    1712.7  0.3854      2     0.8247 
afinal:  Random slopes for block as a function of participants are kept.  
 
Latencies 
Model df AIC BIC loglik deviance Δχ2 Δdf p 
t3  22  5224.7  5365.5  -2590.4    5180.7                              
t1  36  5038.3  5268.6  -2483.2    4966.3  14.42      14   < 2.2e-16 *** 
t2  24  5207.2  5360.7  -2579.6    5159.2  21.554      2   2.088e-05 *** 
tfinal:  Random slopes for block and side of target element, as a function of participants, are 








  Block 
 
 
Side of   
old word 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
left .685 (.275) .745 (.279) .775 (.279) .750 (.251) .760 (.244) .695 (.286) 
right .795 (.245) .725 (.258) .675 (.266) .670 (.295) .730 (.254) .630 (.298) 










List of Figures 
Figure 1 Caption: 
Experiment 1, experimental screen interface, for Test Phase. Example shown for 
condition with counterbalancing factor level “old-old” DOWN.  
 
Figure 2 Caption: 
Experiment 3, experimental screen interface.  Trial shown for condition with “YES  
NO” response mapping.  
 
Figure 3 Caption: 
Experiment 3, mean response latency as a function of Orientation of response options 
and category.  Error bars show 1 SE above and below the mean. 
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